But I wouldn’t have too much hope, at least not yet. However competent General Harding might be, he is still stuck with an unaccountable bloated bureaucracy that turns every good idea into ridiculous rules and restrictions. And he’s also stuck with those legions of screeners who have wildly varying training and intelligence and the power to “interpret” the rules in the most frustratingly inconsistent fashion.

Fixing the things that we all know are wrong with the agency, and particularly earning the public’s trust and confidence, will take an enormous commitment and effort– assuming General Harding actually is interested in doing that. He will still have to contend with the mentality of his bosses that “security” somehow requires a continual accretion of highly visible and highly intrusive hassles that remind all passengers that “we’re doing something,” and that removing even those things that are proved worthless amounts to “weakening protection against terrorism.” And then there’s the risk that an Army general may run the agency in military fashion, with even more aggressive action against the millions of “enemy” who queue up every day at the front lines of the War.

Someone actually in charge of the TSA is certainly better than the headless fowl we have now. And a retired Army intelligence officer is certainly better than the litmus-tested political hacks who brought the TSA to its present state. But we’ll just have to wait and see whether he’ll bring real improvement or just more of the same theater of hassles.

I’d like to make a few comments, if I may.

I’m aware that TSA is using psychological profiling in a limited way. Through my column, and in other ways, along with others, I’m trying to push TSA into greatly expanding their psychological profiling program. It’s my belief that through it, TSA can dramatically improve passenger safety and security. It’s my personal belief they are pushing technology and not profiling because it makes for better theater and “shows” the public they are doing something. Profiling is too low key to make a big impression.

Sir-Wired, you’re right, the TSA rent-a-cops aren’t capable of carrying out a psychological profiling program, but I disagree with you about whether TSA can implement a quality psychological profiling program. I think they can.

Hapgood, I agree with your assessment of TSA. I too believe that testing for explosives can be a good thing, which could prevent on board problems. I just don’t think the way it’s being implemented makes much sense. Chris’ comment reinforces what we’ve both said.

I don’t believe that random inspections makes us any safer. I don’t believe that random inspections work, a belief shared by many security experts. I believe that in using intelligence and psychological profiling to target inspections we will get the most productive results and will make us safer.

John, the point of the McVeigh/Nichols argument is that all terrorists aren’t swarthy middle-eastern types, as Frank seconded, and therefore to profile based on race or other stereotypes is shortsighted and doesn’t work. I understand your comment. I hope mine is clearer now.

I don’t want to throw away the x-ray equipment looking at checked luggage and carry-ons. I want TSA’s program of luggage matching to get better. I’d like to see a solid dog sniffing program instituted for explosive detection. Sometimes low tech really works. I still have major concerns about the full body scanners. I’m concerned about safety and efficacy.

I’d like to see TSA make us safer, but do it in ways that make sense, that will not unnecessarily make travel more difficult than it already is.

Thanks to everyone for your readership and your comments. You might want to consider participating in our forums where we have great discussions about these and other issues.

I think Ned made a (GOOD) point about profiling. I also heard it often at security lines, everyone whining how they’re NOT Muslim/Middle Eastern or how dare they think I look like a terrorist. I would turn and say (several times) “Do you think Timothy McVeigh “LOOKED” like a terrorist? I never got a rebuttal.

I have little doubt that the TSA’s PR pronouncements about “necessary responses to robust intelligence” have a kernel of truth, at least when formulation of those responses start out behind the locked doors of TSA headquarters. The hated rules about liquids probably did begin with extensive testing to determine the quantities of liquids that could safely be carried onto aircraft. And the “3-1-1″ rules surely appeared simple, elegant, and foolproof to all the “security professionals” who participated in the classified meetings where they were refined and codified.

But when those rules were turned into secret regulations and flowed down through the bureaucracy to screeners at checkpoints, the result was anything but simple, elegant, and foolproof. Screeners with inconsistent training and intelligence were given free rein to “interpret” the rules in numerous situations that the group-thinkers at Headquarters never could have considered. So we’re stuck with something that surely started out as a good idea, but in practice is useless. And they can’t go back and reconsider anything because nobody in the bureaucracy wants to be responsible for “weakening security” when the inevitable failure occurs.

Testing for actual explosives (as opposed to liquids and shoes) is surely a good and sensible idea that should improve security. But by the time that good idea flows down to the checkpoints, it will most likely result in more frustration and humiliation for millions of innocent passengers who happen to have picked up traces of nitrates. Since their machines can’t tell the difference between explosives and the more common “innocent” traces, the screeners have no choice but to treat everyone as a “terrorist.”

Similarly, behavioral profiling seems a good and sensible idea. But based on the TSA’s track record, the implementation will almost certainly produce even more “drama and over-acting, unnecessary exaggeration, and little security for travelers to show for it.” And as usual, the only result will be more difficulty for everyone who chooses to fly.

Rather than the current approach of constantly piling on more “theater” and hassles that, if anything, only impair the effectiveness whatever “security” airport screening can provide, the TSA needs thorough housecleaning and re-evaluation from the ground up. It needs leadership that’s accountable for providing effective security measures that minimize needless hassles to passengers. Unfortunately, nobody in the White House, Congress, or the Homeland Security bureaucracy has the courage and intelligence to bring that about. So we’re pretty much stuck with the pathetic tragicomedy we have now.

Since terrorists probably don’t work alone, why would we expect that the person’s hands we are checking have touched any explosive compound. Someone else assisting them could have done all of that especially now that they now what we are going to do.

My experience with TSA is that it’s a whole lot of show for very little real security. My last business trip in January was a prime example. I carry a large laptop bag with lots of electronics and wires. It didn’t get inspected in either direction. Overall I would say that the TSA average is only 50% of the time. Now in Frankfurt Germany last year when I was leaving it took about 20 minutes of very thorough inspection.

Michael