When critics like me call the Transporation Security Administration (TSA) procedures at airports good theater, our definition is a bit different than TSA’s. TSA’s approach at airport security checkpoints, and gates, is to consider them military theaters, and consider everyone going past them, “the enemy.”
TSA doesn’t differentiate between friend and foe. They are just as likely to pull aside an 85 year old grandmother on her way to Florida, as a real terrorist.
When I talk about TSA theater, I’m talking about all show and no substance. I’m talking about drama and over-acting, unnecessary exaggeration, and little security for travelers to show for it.Primarily in reaction to the Christmas Day, 2009 bombing attempt on Northwest Flight 253, TSA has begun a program of swabbing passengers’ hands, to determine if any of them are terrorists who have recently handled explosives.
In the past, screeners swabbed random carry-on luggage and other objects from among the millions and millions carried aboard each year, as they searched for the proverbial needle in the security haystack; an explosive to be carried on board an airplane.
Now TSA has moved its explosive detection to passengers’ hands, to find the same needle. To do that, TSA is randomly swabbing passengers’ hands at airport checkpoints and gates.
Some security experts have hailed passengers’ hands swabbing for explosives as a step in the right direction. Security expert Tony Fainberg says, referring to the current procedure of swabbing luggage handles and parts of bags that were likely contaminated by human hands, “Looking at the hands means you will probably get a better dose [of explosive residue].” While that’s true, I believe Mr. Fainberg and the others who have called this good security, have missed important points.
We know what TSA “expects” to possibly find by their random testing, but is it what they will find? I’m wondering how likely it will be that a random testing program will actually find a terrorist or their explosive. Isn’t it just as likely, or perhaps more likely, that a terrorist won’t be caught by a random testing program than will be caught? While I’m no statistician, I’ve had lots of mathematics courses, and it sure seems that way to me.
I’ve done some research into explosives, especially nitro-compound explosives. It turns out they’re “sticky,” meaning once on you, they are tough to wash off.
Explosives Trace Detection (ETD) equipment, which TSA is using to analyze hand and luggage swabs, are capable of detecting explosive residues as tiny as a nanogram (billionth of a gram). A bomb maker could wash incessantly and even dry-clean their clothes and still ETD equipment can catch them.
That being said, who are the passengers that TSA will likely detect by their random swabbing program. They will include summer campers going home who’ve participated in target shooting, Olympic biathalon competitors, gardeners and farmers who fertilize their plants and crops, people using many anti-dandraff shampoos, and many seniors and others, who carry around nitroglycerine, a common heart medication.
The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) has stated they’ve “always supported explosive detection as a good form of security that doesn’t really invade privacy,” according to spokesperson Jay Stanley. The problem with the ACLU position is they are concerned with discrimination, not with security. They seem to be missing important points.
I agree with the ACLU about discrimination. I’m against profiling, using race, ethnicity, national origin, or religion in selecting passengers for searches; body or belongings. They’re against it solely because it’s discriminatory, and I’m against it because it doesn’t work as a security tool.
Think about it this way. Let’s say the federal government pulls aside every Middle Eastern looking person at the airport for extra screening. How many terrorists do you think they will catch? Any? Do you think a strategy like that would have caught terrorists like Timothy McVeigh, or Terry Nichols?
I think TSA might take a lesson from how the police prevent crime.
Good cops look for something out of place, or a person with an attribute or attitude which “doesn’t click.” It could be as simple as someone approaching a cop who’s acting nervously. It might be sweaty palms or shifty eyes when the person is asked simple direct questions. Trained interrogators know how to read the signs people put out.
Once they think something’s odd or wrong, they pull the person aside. They search them and their belongings, they ask more questions, and more times than not, they find a criminal.
It’s called psychological profiling, and it works. Ask the police, and ask El Al. They’ve all been using this method of detecting criminals and terrorists for years.
I’ve said earlier TSA, security experts, and the ACLU have all missed important points.
They’ve missed the point that random testing is just not likely to uncover a terrorist, but it is likely to trap and humilate grandparents, and senior citizens by the thousands, daily. It’s going to catch home gardeners every spring. It’s even going to catch people trying to rid their heads of those embarrassing white flakes showing up on their dark clothing.
They missed the point that all those electronic, wiz-bang tools aren’t as good as old fashioned quality police work.
If TSA really wants to make us safer and more secure, they need to spend their dollars, not on the latest gadget, but on educated, highly trained agents.
{ 1 trackback }
{ 11 comments… read them below or add one }
ElAl / Ben Gurion is a horrible example for what can be done in the U.S.
Ben Gurion has a total annual traffic volume approximately that of mid-size American airport. (I’ve seen Raleigh/Durham used as an example.) What works there cannot possibly scale up to the U.S. airline industry. El Al hires the best of the best for security personnel; without a major expansion in funding, how could the TSA possibly do the same? Do that many hyper-competent security folks even exist in the U.S. ?
Oh, and if you don’t think El Al engages in the type of profiling repugnant to the U.S. sense of civil liberties, you are kidding yourself. I’m not saying it isn’t necessary for their security, just that it’s never going to fly here, and for good reason.
I’m pretty sure that the TSA already looks for people that are extremely nervous, very out of place, etc. However, serene terrorists most certainly do exist.
Also, telling the TSA rent-a-cops to start pulling over anyone that is the least bit suspicious… given what everyone knows about the common sense displayed by some of the TSA guards, how well do you actually think that would work?
It always makes me laugh when people talk about El Al security. I have the worst poker face in the world, and yet I once carried a sealed package that had been given to me by a co-worker home from Israel. I never even thought about it until the security girl (and they are always very young women) asked if anyone had given me anything to take on the plane. When I had to choose between trusting my co-worker or having my belongings strewn all over the place and possibly missing my flight, my split second decision was to lie and say no. But if they can’t see past me, then why should I believe they can spot a terrorist?
Ned
Since terrorists probably don’t work alone, why would we expect that the person’s hands we are checking have touched any explosive compound. Someone else assisting them could have done all of that especially now that they now what we are going to do.
My experience with TSA is that it’s a whole lot of show for very little real security. My last business trip in January was a prime example. I carry a large laptop bag with lots of electronics and wires. It didn’t get inspected in either direction. Overall I would say that the TSA average is only 50% of the time. Now in Frankfurt Germany last year when I was leaving it took about 20 minutes of very thorough inspection.
Michael
The TSA seems to have a systemic problem of implementation. Anything that starts out as a good and sensible idea inevitably ends up mangled beyond recognition into pointless mindless hassles by the time it gets turned into secret regulations that are inconsistently “interpreted” by screeners at checkpoints. It’s rather like the children’s game of “telephone,” in which “robust intelligence” degenerates into an absurd farce that gives lots of frustration to travelers but little actual security.
I have little doubt that the TSA’s PR pronouncements about “necessary responses to robust intelligence” have a kernel of truth, at least when formulation of those responses start out behind the locked doors of TSA headquarters. The hated rules about liquids probably did begin with extensive testing to determine the quantities of liquids that could safely be carried onto aircraft. And the “3-1-1″ rules surely appeared simple, elegant, and foolproof to all the “security professionals” who participated in the classified meetings where they were refined and codified.
But when those rules were turned into secret regulations and flowed down through the bureaucracy to screeners at checkpoints, the result was anything but simple, elegant, and foolproof. Screeners with inconsistent training and intelligence were given free rein to “interpret” the rules in numerous situations that the group-thinkers at Headquarters never could have considered. So we’re stuck with something that surely started out as a good idea, but in practice is useless. And they can’t go back and reconsider anything because nobody in the bureaucracy wants to be responsible for “weakening security” when the inevitable failure occurs.
Testing for actual explosives (as opposed to liquids and shoes) is surely a good and sensible idea that should improve security. But by the time that good idea flows down to the checkpoints, it will most likely result in more frustration and humiliation for millions of innocent passengers who happen to have picked up traces of nitrates. Since their machines can’t tell the difference between explosives and the more common “innocent” traces, the screeners have no choice but to treat everyone as a “terrorist.”
Similarly, behavioral profiling seems a good and sensible idea. But based on the TSA’s track record, the implementation will almost certainly produce even more “drama and over-acting, unnecessary exaggeration, and little security for travelers to show for it.” And as usual, the only result will be more difficulty for everyone who chooses to fly.
Rather than the current approach of constantly piling on more “theater” and hassles that, if anything, only impair the effectiveness whatever “security” airport screening can provide, the TSA needs thorough housecleaning and re-evaluation from the ground up. It needs leadership that’s accountable for providing effective security measures that minimize needless hassles to passengers. Unfortunately, nobody in the White House, Congress, or the Homeland Security bureaucracy has the courage and intelligence to bring that about. So we’re pretty much stuck with the pathetic tragicomedy we have now.
Several years ago they implemented random testing of bags with swabbing, my husband was asked to bring his golf bag to the test area. Although it is pretty common knowledge that their is fertilizer on golf courses, and that this fertilizer could produce positive readings, I was a bit mortified over how this was handled. Basically the screener kept getting positive results and instead of checking/x raying the golf bag…he kept swabbing until he got a negative result and then let the bag through.
@Cathy: Glad it makes you laugh. Funny thing is the “joke” is on you.
El Al scrutinizes the people, not just their things. They’re not human lie detecting robots. The fact that they didn’t catch you in your “lie” proves nothing. In fact, it probably proves they’re doing their job. Let me explain. First, they do extensive backround checks on their passangers. So even though they didn’t catch your “lie”, they probably had a very good idea about who you are, where you were coming from and going to, and if you were a potential terrorist long before that question from the security girl. Second, you certainly knew there wasn’t a bomb or explosives in that package from your co-worker. Which means you probably weren’t nervous, which means there were no “tells” for the security person to detect. A terrorist, even one as “smooth” as the 9/11 attackers, would be worried about getting caught, even if they hid it really well. This gives the security personnel a chance, albiet small for a well trained attacker, to detect deception. Again, glad you think you “had one over” on El Al, but they know what they’re doing. Luckily you get to view security as a passenger, not as someone who has to detect and stop threats
The whole McVeigh/Nichols argument makes no sense as neither one of them were suicide bombers. They had every intention of staying alive and are not the type to attempt to smuggle an explosive device on a plane on which they are flying. As much as political correctness types like to think otherwise, the attacks we are trying to prevent are only being carried out by one type of person.
@ John.
I think Ned made a (GOOD) point about profiling. I also heard it often at security lines, everyone whining how they’re NOT Muslim/Middle Eastern or how dare they think I look like a terrorist. I would turn and say (several times) “Do you think Timothy McVeigh “LOOKED” like a terrorist? I never got a rebuttal.
Your point about the psychological profiling is a good one, and you should know that TSA is actually deploying this method in the form of Behavioral Detection Officers. They have even made some arrests based on this method. It is one of the only programs that seems to make sense from the perspective of risk based analysis. The real question is why do we swab and pat down and worry so much about a flight originating in Wichita Kansas, as one coming from Egypt, London, or South America? TSA and DHS really need to apply a risk based program for security at the checkpoints and the airports, not a “treat them all like terrorists” approach.
Thanks Liam, I appreciate your comments and everyone else’s, even the ones which disagree with me. Everyone has made valid points and it’s made for great discussion.
I’d like to make a few comments, if I may.
I’m aware that TSA is using psychological profiling in a limited way. Through my column, and in other ways, along with others, I’m trying to push TSA into greatly expanding their psychological profiling program. It’s my belief that through it, TSA can dramatically improve passenger safety and security. It’s my personal belief they are pushing technology and not profiling because it makes for better theater and “shows” the public they are doing something. Profiling is too low key to make a big impression.
Sir-Wired, you’re right, the TSA rent-a-cops aren’t capable of carrying out a psychological profiling program, but I disagree with you about whether TSA can implement a quality psychological profiling program. I think they can.
Hapgood, I agree with your assessment of TSA. I too believe that testing for explosives can be a good thing, which could prevent on board problems. I just don’t think the way it’s being implemented makes much sense. Chris’ comment reinforces what we’ve both said.
I don’t believe that random inspections makes us any safer. I don’t believe that random inspections work, a belief shared by many security experts. I believe that in using intelligence and psychological profiling to target inspections we will get the most productive results and will make us safer.
John, the point of the McVeigh/Nichols argument is that all terrorists aren’t swarthy middle-eastern types, as Frank seconded, and therefore to profile based on race or other stereotypes is shortsighted and doesn’t work. I understand your comment. I hope mine is clearer now.
I don’t want to throw away the x-ray equipment looking at checked luggage and carry-ons. I want TSA’s program of luggage matching to get better. I’d like to see a solid dog sniffing program instituted for explosive detection. Sometimes low tech really works. I still have major concerns about the full body scanners. I’m concerned about safety and efficacy.
I’d like to see TSA make us safer, but do it in ways that make sense, that will not unnecessarily make travel more difficult than it already is.
Thanks to everyone for your readership and your comments. You might want to consider participating in our forums where we have great discussions about these and other issues.
I now see that Obama has chosen a retired general with experience in intelligence to lead the TSA. That MAY be reason to hope that a strong, capable leader will finally step in bring some sensible order to what for too long has been an insane asylum run in utterly haphazard fashion by its most deranged inmates.
But I wouldn’t have too much hope, at least not yet. However competent General Harding might be, he is still stuck with an unaccountable bloated bureaucracy that turns every good idea into ridiculous rules and restrictions. And he’s also stuck with those legions of screeners who have wildly varying training and intelligence and the power to “interpret” the rules in the most frustratingly inconsistent fashion.
Fixing the things that we all know are wrong with the agency, and particularly earning the public’s trust and confidence, will take an enormous commitment and effort– assuming General Harding actually is interested in doing that. He will still have to contend with the mentality of his bosses that “security” somehow requires a continual accretion of highly visible and highly intrusive hassles that remind all passengers that “we’re doing something,” and that removing even those things that are proved worthless amounts to “weakening protection against terrorism.” And then there’s the risk that an Army general may run the agency in military fashion, with even more aggressive action against the millions of “enemy” who queue up every day at the front lines of the War.
Someone actually in charge of the TSA is certainly better than the headless fowl we have now. And a retired Army intelligence officer is certainly better than the litmus-tested political hacks who brought the TSA to its present state. But we’ll just have to wait and see whether he’ll bring real improvement or just more of the same theater of hassles.