According to reports from pilots when discussing the Colgan Air crash in Buffalo, many major airlines might be in for a similar result should their pilots face an icing stall similar to the one that grounded CO Flight 3407. Simulator training for dealing with icing is not regularly held.
Icing stall training is not part of the regularly-held simulator training. Newspaper stories have focused on the poor pay, long commutes and fatigue of regional pilots. They have reported on the pilots having extraneous conversations during landing operations. However, it was a stall and the inappropriate actions of the captain of flight 3407 that doomed the aircraft — conditions for which he as a pilot probably never faced, even in a simulator.
In fact, inflight icing training seems to be rare. Here’s the description of one specialized NASA course on the subject:
Under the guidance of experienced instructors, course attendees practice flight control techniques associated with loss of stability and control effectiveness. A structured one hour training session is provided to all full course attendees.
The full course fee is $1,629.00, limited to 16 attendees, which includes a binder and CD containing all lecture materials and a DVD of each attendee’s training session in the ICEFTD. The reduced course fee for the Tuesday and Wednesday lectures is $699.00.
This training is above and beyond the normal pilot training. Obviously, it is not inexpensive.
Though safety experts have been calling for simulator training for inflight icing conditions, such training does not seem currently to be in place at regional commuter airlines or the major airlines.
The Icing Branch at NASA Glenn Research Center performs research activities related to the development of methods for evaluating and simulating the growth of ice on aircraft surfaces, the effects that ice may have on the behavior of aircraft in flight, and the behavior of ice protection & detection systems
The American flying public is in danger whenever passenger aircraft are flying an approach during snow and icing conditions. Few pilots are experienced at the counter-intuitive actions necessary to arrest an icing stall. The natural response is to pull the nose up to gain altitude, when the proper response is to push the nose down to gain speed and then ascend.
A CBS report noted that the FAA didn’t have directives requiring simulator stall training.
Cogan Air acknowledged Monday that Renslow’s training for the Dash 8-Q400 Bombardier didn’t include a demonstration or simulation of the stick-pusher system. It noted that the Federal Aviation Administration doesn’t require a simulator demonstration of the stick-pusher and added that Renslow “had all the training and experience required to safely operate the Q400.”
A stick-pusher automatically kicks in when a plane is about to stall, pointing the aircraft’s nose down into a dive so it can pick up enough speed to allow the pilot to guide it to a recovery.
However, when Flight 3407’s stick-pusher kicked in on approach to Buffalo Niagara International Airport, Renslow pulled back on the plane’s control column, apparently trying to bring the aircraft out of the sudden dive by raising the nose up. Pushing forward to gain speed is the proper procedure.
The activation of a stick pusher can be a jarring experience for any pilot, especially if the pilot has never experienced it before, said William Waldock, an aviation science professor at Embry-Riddle University in Prescott, Ariz. The natural response is to pull back unless you’ve been trained through repetition to push forward, he said.
As in all things governmental, studies have been underway to determine whether inflight icing stall training is adequate. The NTSB recommended two years ago that the FAA study whether pilot training on stick-pushers should be improved. But there was no change in training requirements when the FAA revised its training manual last fall on stall recovery.
Many experts, government regulators and outside observers seem to think that it is inexcusable to put pilots in the captain’s seat without inflight training or simulator training to deal with stalls and the resulting “stick-pusher” requirements. However, there is no FAA rule to that effect.
Yes, the pilots on the ill-fated CO 3407 may have been fatigued, they may have been underpaid and they may have been talking about something other than the landing, but the cause of the crash was lack of hands-on training that most of our commercial pilots do not have and that the airlines and the FAA do not provide simulator time or programs to experience.
{ 5 comments… read them below or add one }
“Few pilots are experienced at the counter-intuitive actions necessary to arrest an icing stall. The natural response is to pull the nose up to gain altitude, when the proper response is to push the nose down to gain speed and then ascend.”
Huh what?! This statement is completely false. While an icing stall occurs at a higher speed than a normal stall, the basic actions necessary to recovery are no different than from any other stall. And those actions are ones that most certainly should be reflex for ANY pilot. (An icing stall may differ in precisely how the controls will respond to inputs, but there is no excuse for pulling back on the stick like he did; that was the exact WRONG thing to do.) EVERY stall recovery involves dipping the nose to increase speed, and then gradually bringing it back up to increase altitude. While what you are supposed do with the throttle and the flaps differ depending on the situation, but you NEVER pull back on the stick as step 1.
During my short stint taking flying lessons (my last lesson happened to be my solo), we practiced stall recovery starting literally with the very first lesson. The fundamentals are identical for a Cessna 152 and a 747. Anybody that didn’t get thrown out of flying lessons as a teenager should be VERY experienced with the basic actions necessary for stall recovery. While the actions would be counter-intuitive for somebody that has never piloted a plane, they should be second nature for ANY pilot. If I had done what he did after my 3rd or 4th lesson, my instructor probably would have immediately taken the controls, and ended the lesson until he could figure out how to get me to do the correct actions.
In addition, during ground training classes, we spent three entire hours on when icing should be expected, and also its effects on the plane. (The primary effect is… an increase in the stall speed.)
I suspect he was simply not a good student. Just as when you cram for an exam, you may pass, but have difficulty applying the knowledge later. I think the same happened here.
If he had done the actions necessary for a regular stall recovery, instead of the possibly slightly different actions needed for a icing stall, we could argue about icing training. Instead, the pilot did exactly what he was never supposed to do for any stall, under any conditions, for reasons we will never be able to fully understand.
SirWired
I think you need to do more research. IF you have 10 hours as a student pilot, you have had stall training. If you have a private pilots license, you have deministrated stall recovery to a FAA examiner. While icing conditions present additional challenges, such as stalling at a higher airspeed”, it is still a stall and all pilots have practiced recovering from them numerious times. To say that “The American flying public is in danger…” is irresponsible reporting that breeds fear into travelers. You show that you failed to to the proper research into this article and presented only half the facts. .
Charlie is correct about not doing icing stalls in a sim and that icing stall recoveries are different from standard stalls – but – that being said – Charlie – whats the point here?
Colgan 407 did not experience a tail plane stall related to icing. It stalled because the airspeed got too slow. Or did you not get that part from watching the
So – whats the point?
And as Scott say, these 2 pilots had over 1 minute to prevent that disaster – in fact, the correct recovery technique takes less time to do that it takes to say. Unload the wing, full power. End of problem. Neither of them were paying attention to what they were doing – and THAT the American public deserves better.
I’m not a pilot (of any type), but if he/they have never had stick shaker training or experienced it they may have not realized it was a “stall” (ice related or otherwise). (How big of a plane is it before they have stick shaker). Not realizing it was a stall, though went completely the wrong direction (Pilot pulled the stick back, co-pilot retracted flaps, pilot ONLY applied SOME extra power). Maybe the though there was a mechanical/structural failure.
When I saw the news that he (PIC) had only a few hundred hours in that type of aircraft and investigators where confused by its erratic behavior, my first guess was he wasn’t experienced enough to respond to something about the Dash-8/400. (He’d been previously flying Saab Turbo’s, do they have a stick shaker).
My primary though on the training issue was, they needed more/some training on the stick shaker. (It sounds like, they didn’t know what was happening. I’m sure they’ve read about it, but it may sometimes (when you are tired, suddenly getting a shot of adrenaline, uncertain), it may take your mind a minute or 2 to realize a useful fact, by which time (for them) it was too late. I think the investigators have a term for the last critical mistake that renders the accident unavoidable, this would be that point. (It could have been avoided earlier had they monitored their speed).